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ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: Study on the implementation of Formal Safety Assessment for
the development of the mandatory Polar Code
Degree:

MSc

The dissertation carries out a comprehensive analysis of the implementation of
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for the development of the mandatory code for ships
navigating in polar water (“the Polar Code”). The risk-based Polar Code is developed
with functional requirements and supporting prescriptive regulations in order to ensure
the safe navigation and environmental protection in polar waters, which is comparatively
more environmentally vulnerable.
The key process during the development of the Polar Code is presented adopting
the independent environmental protection part. A historical review of the Polar Code
will be summarized from the adoption of the Guidelines for ships operating in Arctic
ice-covered water in 2002 to the Guidelines for ships operating in polar waters in 2009,
which is a basis for the further study.
The current achievement of FSA will be reviewed and the new direction of research
of FSA will be discussed according to the research and opinions of experts. The
framework and limitations of FSA will also be illustrated to point out challenges to carry
out the FSA.
The recommendation of FSA for the Polar Code will be discussed through the
preparatory stage and further FSA stages. The limitations, advantages and disadvantages
will be carefully analyzed and discussed.

Feasible and practical solutions and options

will be provided based on the analysis.
As a part of the conclusion, recommendations for future work relating to the
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environmental part of the Polar Code will be provided to IMO, international
organizations and member states.

KEYWORDS: Polar Code, FSA, environmental protection, Arctic waters,
environmental risk evaluation criteria, environmental risk acceptance criteria
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Trends and forecasts indicate that polar shipping will grow in volume and diversify
in the coming years and these challenges need to be met without compromising
either safety of life at sea or the sustainability of the polar environment.
The Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment has been tasked with
coordinating the drafting work, and reporting to the Maritime Safety Committee
(MSC) and Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC).
The move to develop a mandatory Polar Code follows the adoption of the
recommendatory Guidelines for ships operating in polar waters (Resolution A.1024
(26)) by IMO’s MSC and MEPC committees separately. The main purpose of the
Guidelines is to address those additional provisions deemed necessary for
consideration beyond existing requirements of the SOLAS and MARPOL
Conventions. The specific climatic conditions of polar waters, the safety as well as
environmental protection are all considered by the working group.
Considering the mandatory Polar Code, it aims at providing a risk-based code with
proactively functional requirements and supporting prescriptive regulations for safety
and environmental protection concerns. The drafting work is conducted by DE with
support from member states and other interested stakeholders such as NGOs and
classification societies.
The mandatory Polar Code is intended to function alongside existing IMO
conventions, such as SOLAS and MARPOL. One of its functions is to augment
“baseline” environmental protection of polar waters to reflect their increased
environmental sensitivity. If certain specific locations within polar waters need
further protection this will be provided by existing mechanisms separate from the
Polar Code.
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Meanwhile, the formal safety assessment has been described as "a rational and
systematic process for assessing the risks associated with shipping activity and for
evaluating the costs and benefits of IMO's options for reducing these risks"(MSC
91/16). It can be used as a tool to help evaluate new regulations or to compare
proposed changes with existing standards.
The Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO rule-making
process were approved in 2002 and amended in 2006. The formal safety assessment
involves much more scientific aspects than previous conventions. The benefits of
adopting formal safety assessment as a regulatory tool include the following (Marine
Safety Agency, 1993):
l

A consistent regulatory regime that addresses all aspects of safety in an
integrated way;

l

Cost effectiveness, whereby safety investment is targeted to where it will
achieve the greatest benefit;

l

A proactive approach enabling hazards that have not yet given rise to accidents
to be properly considered;

l

Confidence that regulatory requirements are in proportion to the severity of the
risks;

l

A rational basis for addressing new risks posed by ever-changing marine
technology.

Until now, the FSA is still the state of art for rule-making process and the topic has
moved from safety issues to environmental issues.

Discussion on appropriate

environmental risk criteria is still underway and a working group was established in
2013 in order to finish the job as soon as possible.
Increasing vessel traffic in polar waters indicates an expected increase in accidents
and incidents, which are major contributors to marine pollution. The mandatory
Polar Code is the only document under development for these specific areas. The
environmental protection part needs to be developed and finished according to the
schedule; therefore, it is urgent and essential to consider the application of FSA into
the rule-making process of the Code.
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1.2. Objectives and methodology of research
The primary objective of this dissertation is to identify the challenges of the FSA
studies for the Polar Code focusing on the environmental protection issues, according
to an analysis of the preparatory work and the 5 steps of FSA separately. Possible
and practical solutions and methods will be recommended by the author accordingly.
Moreover, recommendations and suggestions for future works will be concluded
according to the results of the study. The subsequent purpose of this dissertation is to
give a general review of the development of FSA and the polar code. The tendency
of recent research and new topics under discussion will be also introduced and
discussed.
The dissertation will commence from a historical review of IMO’s Polar Code and
illustrate all related International regulations and IMO instruments in order to clarify
the current regulatory regime for the polar waters. The environmental protection part
will be highlighted by the author for further discussion. Based on an analysis of the
framework of FSA, potential problems, limitations and disadvantages of current FSA
will be identified and assessed, taking into consideration the recent research and
opinions of experts. The new topic of establishing environmental risk evaluation
criteria will be also be discussed briefly. Then the necessity of implementing the
FSA for the Polar Code concerning environmental protection could be confirmed
according to the aforementioned issues and the challenges for the preparatory work
and each FSA step will be analyzed according to an investigation into working
reports including AMSA 2009 report, IAATO report and HAZID workshop report.
Then the potential choices of solutions to carry out an appropriate FSA can be
approached. By comparing and analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of those
potential choices, feasible recommendations will be concluded accordingly.
1.3. Organization of dissertation
To	
   start	
   with,	
   chapter	
   1	
   will	
   provide	
   an	
   introduction	
   and	
   background	
   to	
   the	
  
research,	
   the	
   objectives	
   and	
   methodology	
   as	
   well	
   as	
   the	
   organization	
   of	
   the	
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dissertation.	
   	
  
In the second chapter, the development of the IMO Polar Code will be introduced by
a historical review. The present and forthcoming conventions and regulations
published not only by IMO but also by related organizations will be discussed. The
study achievements by experts will be reviewed as a basis for further study.
In the third part, the background and development as well as the current
achievements and new topics of FSA will be introduced and analyzed. The major
framework and limitations of FSA will be carefully analyzed. The environmental
issues as a global trend will be concluded for further discussion.
In chapter 4, the preparatory work of FSA for the polar will be analyzed according to
the status of historical data. The possibility and priority for the future FSA will be
analyzed and discussed with differences between two polar waters as well as the
necessity and feasibility of safety risks and environmental risks.
Chapter 5 will focus on the detailed FSA steps. The HAZID will be analyzed
referring to the HAZID workshop report. During the process of analyzing, qualitative
methods and the quantitative methods will be illustrated with key factors. After
pointing out the challenges of FSA, possible and more feasible methods and options
will be provided accordingly.
In the last chapter, all findings and outcomes of the study will be concluded.
Moreover, recommendations for future work will be provided for IMO and interested
stakeholders of the Polar Code to develop the environmental sector.
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2.

The IMO Polar Code

2.1. Historical review of the development of regulations for polar waters by
IMO
From 1996, in order to harmonize those rules and regulations pertaining to Polar
Regions, The Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment (DE) has been tasked
with coordinating the work of developing a strong Polar Code for the ice-covered
waters. The results of the working group have been reported to the Maritime Safety
Committee (MSC) and Maritime Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) for
further discussion.
However, the progress of the Polar Code in IMO is quite slow and complex
considering the nature of polar waters.

According to the data of IMO document DE

41/10,1997 (Development of a Polar Code —The International Code of Safety for
Ships in Polar Waters), the Polar Code was originally drafted by an outside working
group of technical experts in neutral words assigned by IMO from different
administrators and classification societies. The main purpose of this draft is to
harmonize the different legal regimes within those areas for future shipping
requirements.
From then on, this draft of the Polar Code, covering Arctic and Antarctic waters, was
thoroughly discussed by IMO. After an extensive exchange of views and options
from different countries and related organizations, considering the different nature of
the two polar waters as well as the problem of application scope, DE transferred its
Polar Code framework into a recommendatory guideline for ships navigating in
Arctic ice-covered waters after MSC 71 in 1999.
Later on, the Guidelines for ships operating in Arctic ice-covered waters were
approved by MSC and MEPC separately in 2002 by an MSC/MEPC joint circular
(MSC/Circ.1056 – MEPC/Circ.399) as an addition to the mandatory and
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recommendatory provisions existing in IMO instruments.
However, The Maritime Safety Committee, at its seventy-ninth session in 2004,
received a submission from South Africa on behalf of the Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Parties (MSC 79/8/2 (Secretariat)). Considering the increasing level of
shipping, especially in the tourist areas, ATCM invited IMO to amend the guidelines
for ships operating in Arctic ice-covered waters so as to also be applicable to ships
navigating in ice-covered waters within the Antarctic Treaty Area. They believed
that the IMO’s membership had far more States than those states under the Antarctic
Treaty.
Therefore, a modification of the guidelines for compatibility with the Antarctic was
proposed and open for comments from other countries and related organizations.
Technical requirements relating to double bottom construction as well as the
replacement of “Arctic and Antarctic” in the title of the Guidelines was proposed by
ATCM. Moreover, the DE Sub-Committee noted that more attention should be paid
to passenger ships that only visited the Polar Regions (DE 50/27, 2007).
As a result, IMO also adopted the Guidelines on Voyage Planning for passenger
ships operating in remote areas in 2007 (A 25/Res.999) especially for passenger
ships operating in remote areas in order to prevent incidents of groundings and
collisions.
From further discussion on the development of the Guidelines by the Working Group,
they recognized that “ice-coverage is not the only challenge when sailing in Polar
waters” (DE 52/WP.2, 2009) and decided to change the “ice-covered waters” of the
title into “polar waters”. However, the word “Guidelines” was kept for the
recommendatory nature of the provisions of this document. Finally, Guidelines for
ships operating in Polar Waters was adopted by IMO Assembly on 2 December 2009
Resolution A.1024 (26).
After consulting opinions and proposals from different countries and organizations,
the Guidelines for ships operating in polar waters was adopted by IMO Assembly on
2 December 2009 ((Resolution A.1024 (26)).
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However, even before the adoption of the Guidelines, the further move to develop a
mandatory code for polar areas was proposed by some NGO members such as FOEI,
Greenpeace and WWF during the DE 53rd session in 2009. From their report
submitted to DE Sub-Committee (MSC 86/23/19, 2009), the urgency of developing a
mandatory code for polar waters was described according to records of accidents that
happened in the Southern Ocean from 2008 to 2009 and the ship-born tourist
activities in Antarctica as well as the increasing number of ships operating in the
Arctic and the accidents that have happened over the last decade. A rapid ratification
and full implementation including compensation and liability instruments was
encouraged by these organizations.
Meanwhile, a proposed framework of the Code was submitted by Canada during DE
53rd session. The document DE/10 of 1997 was repeated again as it was written in
neutral language and still sufficient in scope to work as a mandatory provision.
When it came to discussion of a mandatory code for Polar Regions, for the first time,
a risk-based approach in determining the scope was proposed by Germany (DE
54/13/1) wherein the provisions of the code would be supported by the overall goals
and functional requirements for ships operating in polar waters in order to mitigate
identified risks to acceptable levels and minimize the consequences of identified
risks.
From 2011 to 2013, discussions between various countries and organizations have
focused on issues such as boundaries of the polar region and environmental aspects.
During this period of time, more attention was paid by the maritime field to polar
risk assessment and establishing a risk basis for the Polar Code in order to develop a
powerful mandatory Polar Code.

2.2. Present and forthcoming conventions, regulations and proposals published
by IMO and other Organizations for polar waters
Over the last 20 years, IMO as well as other related organizations and countries have
developed a lot of regulations, guidelines and recommendations regarding the polar

17	
  

waters.
In this section, the major existing legal framework before and after the development
of a mandatory Polar Code will be illustrated and discussed in detail.

2.2.1. UNCLOS and Antarctic Environmental Protocol
UNCLOS is a legal framework governing the rights and responsibilities of nations in
their use of ocean space. The convention was concluded in 1982 and came into force
in 1994. As of August 2013, 166 countries including the European Union have
ratified the Convention.
According to section 8, Article 234 (Ice-covered areas):
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from
vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone,
where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering
such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to
navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to
or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations
shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the
marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.
This is the only Article of UNCLOS that has a direct influence in the polar waters
and allows coastal states of polar waters to pass and enforce rules on pollution within
their exclusive economic zones in order to solve the problem of foreign shipping
traffic. However, the definition of “ice-covered area” mentioned in this article was
not clearly clarified in UNCLOS. Therefore, a lot of discussions and arguments have
been raised and it has not yet been agreed upon and fully applied in Polar Regions.
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty is one of the most
important additions to the Antarctic Treaty System and provides for comprehensive
protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems.
This protocol including 27 articles and 6 Annexes was concluded in 1991 and
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entered into force on January 14, 1998. Until now, 33 parties have joined and ratified
this protocol. Although this protocol is not able to regulate all kinds of activities of
vessels operating in both Polar waters, it provides a good foundation for the
environmental protection part of the Polar Code.
However, these regional groupings of states commonly have jurisdiction over
vessel-borne pollution within their capacities as flag or port states, for instance,
Annex IV, named “Prevention of Marine Pollution of the Environmental Protocol to
the Antarctic Treaty.

2.2.2. IMO instruments
As Article 234 of UNCLOS mentioned above only provides a general jurisdictional
framework regarding vessel-borne pollution for ice-covered areas, those IMO
instruments have played an important role in the further operational stage.
Considering difficulties in complying with those various requirements among
regional States with navigation and discharge standards, IMO instruments have long
been involved in harmonizing these requirements for the overall interests in
international shipping. Those major conventions including SOLAS, MAROL 73/78
and STCW will be illustrated briefly in this section.
The International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) is regarded as the
most important international treaty considering the safety of ships and provides
minimum standards for the construction, equipment and operation of ships.
The provisions relating to the ice-covered areas can be found in Chapter V,
navigation requirements. Referring to Regulation 5, Meteorological services and
warnings, it says that weather information suitable for shipping shall be collected and
analyzed including the ice data. Regulation 6, Ice Patrol Services, requires ships
transiting the region of icebergs guarded by the Ice Patrol during the ice season to
make use of the services provided by the Ice Patrol. Moreover, Regulation 31,
Danger message, and Regulation 32, Information Required in Danger message,
regulate masters to communicate information on dangers to navigation including
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dangerous ice and its specification.
In 2008, IMO adopted the International Code on Intact Stability, 2008 (2008 IS Code)
and it entered into force on 1 July 2010. The provisions of part A of the IS Code are
mandatory under the 1974 SOLAS Convention and the 1988 Load Lines Protocol
while Part B is recommendatory (Resolution MSC.267(85)). According to Part B,
Chapter 6, Icing consideration, those ships operating in ice-accretion areas are likely
to experience adverse effects on the ship’s stability, so icing allowance should be
included during the analysis of the loading condition.
MARPOL 73/78 is the main convention regulating the prevention of pollution of the
marine environment from vessel-source pollution with discharge and emission
standards developed by IMO. Besides the six Annexes with general requirements for
the ships navigating at sea, MARPOL73/78 also provides stricter standards for a
higher level of protection for the “special areas” and more stringent discharge
standards for the “SOx Emission Control Areas.”
However, the Antarctic area has been designated as a special area under Annex I,
Prevention of pollution by oil, Annex II, control of discharge of residues of noxious
liquid substances, and Annex V, Disposal of garbage, while no part of the Arctic
marine area has been designated yet. Moreover, in the Antarctic area new chapter 9
of MARPOL Annex I, establishing a ban on the use and carriage of heavy grade oils,
entered into force on 1 August 2011.
Regarding oil response in ice and snow condition, a new guidance on oil spill
response in ice and snow conditions is still under development by MEPC.
As human factors have been a hot topic over the last decade, a training guidance for
personnel on ships operating in polar waters has also been discussed and developed
during this period.
The newly adopted guidance stresses the importance for officers in charge of a
navigational/engineering watch on board ships operating in polar waters to have
sufficient and appropriate experience with polar waters. There are measures to ensure
the competency of masters and officers of ships operating in polar waters and also
recommend that Governments adopt measures to ensure that masters and officers of

20	
  

ships operating in polar waters have appropriate training and experience.

2.2.3. Guidelines and recommendations
Considering the specific nature of polar waters, IMO has developed several useful
guidelines for ships navigating in those areas as follows:
Guidance for passenger ships operating in areas remote from SAR facilities
(MSC.1/Circ.1184) enhanced planning arrangements for ships operating in remote
areas, including close cooperation and liaison with relevant RCCs in 2006.
Guidelines on voyage planning for passenger ships operating in remote areas
(A.999(25)) adopted on 29 November 2007. This Guidelines provide additions to
voyage and passage plan, such as details on ice and ice formations, ice navigators,
operational limitations due to ice, safe distance to icebergs, and carriage of special or
enhanced equipment.
Guidelines for ships operating in polar waters (A.1024 (26)), adopted by the 26th
IMO Assembly in 2009.

Currently, this is the most comprehensive Guidelines

regarding polar waters and provide a holistic approach for navigational safety in
polar waters and also work as a basis for the development of the mandatory Polar
Code. The details of the contents and structures of the Guidelines will be discussed
in Chapter 3.

2.3. Study and research achievement of mandatory Polar Code made by
working group (DE) of IMO
As the author mentioned in the first Chapter, the decision to develop a mandatory
Polar code was first proposed in the 1990s, but the idea was not accepted by a lot of
countries and then the recommendatory guideline was adopted by IMO. However,
just before the guideline was adopted, the proposal for developing a mandatory Polar
Code came back to the table for discussion and was approved by IMO. The DE
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Sub-committee was again designated as the coordinator and a working group was
organized accordingly for this.
According to DE 53/18, 2009, the outcome of the 32nd Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Meeting (ATCM XXXII) adopted a resolution on a mandatory shipping code for
vessels operating in Antarctic waters (Resolution 8 (2009)). As requested by the
meeting, the Chair of ATCM XXXII corresponded with IMO in this regard and the
text of the resolution was attached for the information of the Sub-Committee.
At the same time, during the period of MSC 86, countries like Argentina, Chile,
Norway, and the United States as well as other related organizations submitted
proposals for new mandatory work on the basis of the guidelines.
From DE53, the working group started to work with this topic. The DE
sub-committee provided a justification for a new work program item “Development
of a Code for ships operating in Polar waters”. During the DE sessions, a
correspondence group was established to work intersessionally. (DE 53/26).
During this meeting, most of the members agreed on the development of a risk based
Code with functional requirements supported by prescriptive provisions with both
mandatory and recommendatory parts (DE 53/26).
Later on, the discussion of the Polar Code in DE 54 moved to the environmental
aspects and DE agreed to utilize a risk-based approach. Therefore, a correspondence
group to review a hazard matrix was developed to identify the hazards. Meanwhile, a
workshop on the environmental aspects of the Polar Code was held in Cambridge
from 27-30 November 2011. The report of this workshop was focused on the Hazard
identification of ships navigating in polar waters.
In 2011, DE55 continued working on the development of a mandatory Code for ships
operating in polar waters, which covered the full range of shipping related matters in
waters surrounding the two poles. More technical parts of the draft code w developed
and discussed, taking into account the outcome of other bodies meeting in the interim
including MEPC and NAV.
In 2012, DE56 continued to work with the draft and agreed with the group’s
recommendation to forward relevant sections to the sub-committees on
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Radiocommunications, Search and Rescue (COMSAR); Fire Protection (FP); Safety
of Navigation (NAV); Stability, Load Lines and Fishing Vessel Safety (SLF); and
Training and Watchkeeping (STW) for their review and input.
In relation to environmental aspects of the Code, the Sub-Committee noted that the
working group had been divided as to whether the environmental protection
provisions should be elaborated as a part of the Code, or as amendments to the
relevant annexes of MARPOL and other appropriate IMO instruments, and decided
to keep any decision on environmental requirements to be included in the Code in
abeyance pending further consideration by the Marine Environment Protection
Committee (MEPC). The Sub-committee also agreed to urge the MEPC and the
MSC to prioritize the discussion on how to make the Polar Code mandatory at their
forthcoming meetings.
At DE57 of 2013, The Sub-Committee made significant progress in further
developing the draft mandatory International Code of safety for ships operating in
polar waters (Polar Code), in particular with the finalization of a draft chapter on
environmental protection for consideration by MEPC 65, and requested the MSC to
authorize the holding of an intersessional meeting of the Polar Code Working Group
in late 2013, to further progress the work.
According to the draft of the Code, the aim is to finalize the draft Code in 2014 for
adoption by the MSC and Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). The
Polar Code is intended to cover the full range of shipping-related matters relevant to
navigation in waters surrounding the two poles – ship design, construction and
equipment; operational and training concerns; search and rescue; and, equally
important, the protection of the unique environment and eco-systems of the polar
regions.
Agreement in principle was reached on definitions for the different categories of ship
to be covered by the Code, as follows:
Category A means a ship capable of operating at least in medium first-year ice which
may include old ice inclusions in accordance with an ice class at least equivalent to
those acceptable to the Organization.
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Category B means a ship capable of operating in sea ice conditions other than those
included in Category A with an ice class at least equivalent to those acceptable to the
Organization.
Category C means any ship which is not a Category A or Category B ship.
It was agreed that that all ships operating in polar waters should have a Polar Ship
Certificate and a Polar Water Operation Manual.
As instructed by the main committees, it was agreed that the Polar Code would be
adopted by separate MSC and MEPC resolutions, with amendments to mandatory
instruments to be developed to make the Code mandatory.

This would also impact

on the structuring of the Code.
The Polar Code correspondence group was re-established to further develop the draft
Code and also draft amendments to mandatory IMO instruments (SOLAS and
MARPOL), to make the Code mandatory.
In addition to DE, from 2010, there has been some revision of international
conventions, considering the situation of polar waters, for instance, MARPOL
convention Chapter 9, Annex I added a new Regulation 43 for using of heavy grade
oil, which entered into force on 1st August 2011.

2.4. Challenges in the development of a mandatory Polar Code
Developing a mandatory Polar Code has been widely discussed over last decade in
the IMO and there have been great achievements, which were mentioned in last
section.
The challenges that the mandatory Polar Code meets with are mostly decided by the
structure of the Polar Code adopted by DE as well as by the specific nature of polar
waters.
Proactive environmental protection for both poles is intended to “avoid an Exxon
Valdez or Concordia-type disaster in polar waters before real regulatory action is
achieved in these vulnerable regions,” said John Katenstaein of Friends of the Earth.
Considering the nature of polar waters, topics such as geographical limitations, scope
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of ships involved, ship categories and differences between the two polar waters have
been discussed and agreement has almost been arrived at, as

can be found in the

recent report of the working group and the current draft of the Polar code.
During DE 54 sessions, the utilization of a risk-based/goal-based approach, as
proposed by Germany (DE 54/13/1), had been adopted and the recent Polar Code
with goals and functional requirements supported by prescriptive provisions has been
provided by the working group for further discussion in DE 56.
This risk-based approach gives not only a sufficient flexibility for alternative designs
and arrangements but also major challenges for further development of the Polar
Code, especially in the environmental protection aspects.
As there will be a special chapter for environmental protection in the Polar Code, the
biggest challenges will include but not be limited to:
l

How to identify and rank all the possible risks?

l

How to set the level of need for additional environmental risks?

l

How to mitigate the environmental risks?

Therefore, in this dissertation, the author would like to recommend the Formal Safety
Assessment, which is a rational and systematic process for assessing the risks
relating to maritime safety and the protection of the marine environment and for
evaluating the costs and benefits of IMO’s options for reducing these risks
(MSC/Circ.1023, 5th April 2002), to work as a tool to provide support and further
suggestions for the future IMO decision-making process for the Polar Code.

2.5. Summary
Global climate change is now providing new opportunities for international
transportation in polar waters.
According to the speech given by Sekimizu, the secretary-general of IMO, at the
opening of the 53rd session of the DE sub-committee:
The recent developments are opening the way for the North Pole region to be
used by international navigation, and rendering its vast resources easier to
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access, makes it all the more important for us to take action to ensure not
only the safety of ships passing through but also that any exploration and
production activities taking place therein are conducted in a manner that will
have no negative impact on the environment. (DE 53/INF.7)
Therefore, although the working group on the Polar Code, with support from various
international organizations, has made great achievements in developing a mandatory
Polar Code, more academic studies and discussions relating to environmental risks
for ship navigating in polar waters shall be continuously carried out by IMO.
The formal safety assessment is complicated with a few limitations; however,
compared to other novel methods, it is still a reliable method recommended by IMO
for the rule-making process.
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3. The Formal Safety Assessment recommended by IMO
3.1. Background and development of IMO Guidelines for FSA
The concept of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) was developed in the 1990’s after a
series of ship accidents happened, especially involving bulk carriers. Therefore, in
1993, the UK Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) submitted a document about a new
approach to marine safety involving risk assessment and benefit assessment
techniques for IMO’s rule making process for shipping. This was the basis for the
future development of FSA in IMO.
During MSC 62nd session in 1993, the proposal of the UK was accepted and a
corresponding group in-between was established accordingly. After two years, a
seminar on FSA was held at IMO headquarters and the FSA concept was strongly
supported by member governments to be used in future IMO rule-making process.
Meanwhile, MSC decided to establish a working group for the development of
Guidelines for the application of FSA.
During further discussion within the working group, the MEPC committee was also
invited to be involved in the development of the Guidelines in order to address
environmental protection issues. Later on, the “interim Guidelines for the
Application of Formal Safety Assessment to the IMO Rule-Making Process”
(MSC/cir.829, MEPC/cir.335) was approved separately by MSC and MEPC in 1997.
After the MSC 68 session, more input from active participants as the result of trial
applications were provided by several member states of IMO and at the MSC 69
session, the committee agreed to “expand the FSA interim guidelines in order to
clarify the incorporation of the HE and to consider the mechanism by which they
could be used within the IMO rule-making process.”
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Finally, the Maritime Safety Committee, at its seventy-fourth session (30 May to 8
June 2001), and the Marine Environment Protection Committee, at its forty-seventh
session (4 to 8 March 2002), approved:
1 Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO rule-making
process (MSC/Circ.1023-MEPC/Circ.392); and
2 Guidance on the use of Human Element Analysing Process (HEAP) and Formal
Safety

Assessment

(FSA)

in

the

IMO

rule-making

process

(MSC/Circ.1022-MEPC/Circ.391).
This was the sign of the official adoption of the FSA by IMO and further
implementation work is still under discussion in IMO. Therefore, during the
seventy-fifth session of the Maritime Safety Committee, there were various studies
on

bulk

carrier

safety

submitted

by

different

countries

with

different

recommendations.
However, after a joint MSC/MEPC working group on the human element was
established in MSC 78, the MEPC committee decided to establish a correspondence
group on FSA matters under the coordination of Japan.
Later, The MSC committee decided to establish a correspondence group to review
the Guidelines and prepare draft amendments and also established a working group
to consider the need for a group of experts on FSA.
According to MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.5, the committee approved AMENDMENTS TO
THE GUIDELINES FOR FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT (FSA) FOR USE IN
THE IMO RULE-MAKING PROCESS (MSC/Circ.1023 - MEPC/Circ.392) in 2006.
During MSC’s 84th Session in 2008, the Committee agreed, in general, to establish
an FSA Expert Group. From then on, the topic of Environmental Risk Evaluation
Criteria became a hot topic and a corresponding group coordinated by Greece was
established for this topic. Meanwhile a review of FSA studies submitted by
SAFEDOR was conducted by FSA experts of IMO. As a result, in 2011, MEPC 62
considered and approved the report of its Working Group on Environmental Risk
Evaluation Criteria within the context of FSA (MEPC62/WP.13). The revised
guidelines for FSA was reviewed and approved at the MSC 91(2012) and MEPC 65
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(2013) separately and the environmental risk evaluation criteria were included in the
Annex of the Guideline. (MSC-MEPC.2/CIRC.12, 2012)

3.2. The recent achievement and application of FSA in the shipping industry
The first application of the FSA Guidelines happened after the adoption of the
“Interim Guidelines” (IMO 1997) and at that time the FSA was named “Trial
Applications”. The first reports were submitted by the UK with the title “FSA on
High Speed Craft (HSC) in 1997. However, these reports were extremely criticized
because of the Regulatory Impact Diagram (RID) adopted as a risk model. Although
these reports were not accepted for the rule-making process, they contributed to the
future amendment of the FSA Guidelines.
Another important case of FSA for Helicopter landing Area (HLA) on Cruise ships
was carried out following the Estonia Accident (Estonia 1997). This FSA/HLA was
carried out by DNV (Skjong et al., 1997) and later submitted to IMO for review. This
is the first case including a benefits and costs assessment in which IMO took the
recommendations from the FSA reports into consideration for the rule-making
process.
The unforgettable case in FSA history in IMO shall be the Bulk Carrier Double Hull
case. The FSA on bulk carrier safety was proposed by the UK in 1998. After that,
different countries such as Norway, UK and Japan as well as some organizations like
IACS

and

INTERCARGO

separately

submitted

their

FSA

reports

and

recommendations to IMO. Moreover, there was an international study coordinated by
the UK from 1999 and related progress reports and recommendations were submitted
accordingly.
During MSC71 (IMO, 1999) to MSC 76 (December 2002), the discussion between
countries was focus on the risk control options and the quantification period of costs
and benefits assessment. Many recommendations including double side skin for bulk
carriers were submitted to IMO through FSA reports. After reviewing

all of the

FSAs, IMO agreed to implement double side skin for bulk carriers larger than 150
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meters at MSC 76.
However, after accepting a review document of FSA with the title “Comparative
Study of Single and Double Side Skin Bulk Carriers” (Greece, 2004) by Greece, the
issue of mandating double side skin bulk carriers was taken back to the table of IMO
for discussion and debate. After a voting process, this issue was abandoned by IMO
in MSC 78 session. Considering the immediate change of decision, there was a lot of
criticism on this action and many people considered it a failure of FSA application in
IMO’s rule-making process under a kind of political pressure.
Another recent successful case of FSA study in IMO is the mandatory carriage
requirement for Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS). This
study was submitted by DNV under support of Denmark and Norway (MSC
81/INF.9) in 2006 and a Bayesian Network model was adopted as a modeling
technique. According to the final report of the FSA on ECDIS (MSC81/24/5), it says
the ECDIS, as cost-effective equipment, should be mandatory for most

ships,

excluding only smaller vessels.
As a result, an amendment to SOLAS Chapter 5 about ECDIS entered into force for
passenger ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards constructed on or after 1 July
2012 and tankers of 3,000 gross tonnage and upwards constructed on or after 1 July
2012. Other sizes of ships and types will be required to carry ECDIS in the years to
come.
A large project of Design, Operation and Regulation for Safety (SAFEDOR)
sponsored by the European Commission is also a recent great achievement of FSA.
The project started in 2005 and closed in 2009 with several FSA reports on different
kinds of ships and a book titled “Risk Based Ship Design”. The list of the FSA
reports with related hazard identification reports submitted by SAFEFOR are listed
as follows:
l

FSA LNG Carriers (MSC 83/INF.3, 2007)

l

FSA container vessels (MSC 83/INF.8, 2007)

l

FSA crude oil tankers (MEPC 58/INF.2, 2008)

l

FSA Cruse ships (MSC 85/INF.2, 2008)
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l

FSA RoPax ships (MSC 85/INF.3, 2008)

l

FSA dangerous goods (MSC87/INF.2, 2009)

The main purpose of this project was to improve maritime safety through the
integration of safety into design and also to enhance the competiveness of maritime
industry by a proposal for a modern regulatory framework and new ship designs.
(page 3, SAFEDOR 2006).
In the final report of this project, the mandatory review for new and major revisions
of instruments of IMO with acceptable criteria (page 47, SAFEDOR 2009) as well as
accident reporting and underreporting issues were also recommended by the working
group. It means that the FSA is still state of art for IMO’s rule-making process and
more works for the Guidelines need to be done by the Organization.
After the SAFEDOR project, other than the revision of FSA guidelines, recent FSArelated activity within the IMO has moved on two parallel fronts. (Kontovas, 2009).
The first one was the review of the FSA studies submitted by SAFEDOR as well as
other countries and organizations by FSA experts and the second one was working
with environmental risk evaluation criteria, which focuses on oil pollution (Kontovas,
2009).
Therefore, from 2009 until now, Japan is leading the group of experts to work on the
environmental risk evaluation criteria and, meanwhile, IACS and Germany continue
to work on FSA studies on topics such as safety of general cargo ship (MSC
88/INF.8, 2010) and stowage of water-reactive materials (DSC 16/INF.2, 2011). In
2012, during the MEPC 62, the committee established a working group on
environmental risk evaluation criteria to finalize the step 4 cost-benefit assessment of
FSA with an appropriate volume-dependent CATS global threshold scale (MEPC
62/24).

3.3. Framework and Limitations of FSA
According to the Guidelines of FSA (MSC/MEPC.2/Circ.12), the framework of an
FSA study could be divided into five steps as follows:
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Step 1: Identification of hazards;
Step 2: Risk analysis;
Step 3: Risk control options;
Step 4: Cost-benefit assessment; and
Step 5: Recommendations for decision-making.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the 5 steps as well as the preparatory work
that shall be done beforehand.

Figure 1. Flow chart of FSA (IACS, MSC75-5)
The Figure 1 of IMO shows the linkage between 5 steps throughout the FSA study.
The weak linkage between step 1 and step 2 as well as step 1 and step 3 is always
mentioned in the report of review of the FSA study and will be discussed later.
During the preparatory period of FSA, the definition of the problem shall be clearly
illustrated referring to those types of ships and regulations that need to be reviewed.
The boundary of the study is usually to be narrowed for further assessment and
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application. If the scope of the FSA study is too large, it may take more time to
complete the final report and also is difficult for others to review as well as further
implement.
For the first step, all potential hazardous scenarios shall be identified and ranked
accordingly. It has been noticed that most FSA studies have used historical data from
different databases of marine casualties. However, FSA study is a proactive method
for rule making.

A list of hazards identified only from historical data could not be

used for discussions about adding new measures to reduce risk because sufficient
data for these accidents needs to be collected beforehand.
Another big limitation of using historical data is the reliability and transparency of
the database. A great number of warnings and “near misses” were not included in the
database and those important potential hazards could not be identified at the first
stage. In the report of SAFEDOR (SAFEDOR, 2009), the underreporting issues were
mentioned and Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) was strongly
recommended at that time.
When it comes to ranking the identified hazards, a risk matrix (Table 3) based on the
severity index and frequency index (see Table 1, Table 2) can be adopted according
to the annex of FSA Guidelines (MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12)

Table1: Severity Index
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Table 2: Frequency Index

Table 3: Risk matrix based on above Severity and Frequency index
Although this risk matrix will not be used for decision-making, this is an important
tool that IMO provides for experts during the hazard identification step. However,
the limitation of this two-dimensional table has been discussed because it
overemphasizes frequent, low-consequence events over extremely rare accidents that
are really catastrophic (Kontovas, 2005). Moreover, during the hazard identification
step, a suitable expert group shall be carefully selected and the concordance matrix
included in FSA Guidelines shall be carried out after the ranking of hazards.
According to FSA Guidelines, step 3, Risk control options, shall find out areas
needing control and risk control measure (RCM) accordingly. Meanwhile, the
effectiveness of RCM in risk reduction shall be evaluated by re-evaluating step 2. At
last, RCMs shall be grouped into risk control options for decision-makers. However,
this step, which strongly relies on the experts’ subjective opinions, will be a problem
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for the future decision-making period. What’s more, the interrelationship between
different RCMs always raises questions during the review process and needs to be
clarified in the report.
The cost benefit analysis (CBA) is obviously an important step and also a difficult
and complicated one. Referring to the RCOs identified in step3, the benefits and
costs shall be carefully compared. Currently, the Cost of Averting a Fatality (CAF)
with the “$3m Criteria” is commonly adopted in FSA studies. As an outcome of step
4, the identification of cost effectiveness shall be expressed by suitable indices such
as Gross Cost of Averting a Fatality (GCAF) and Net Cost of Averting a Fatality
(NCAF).
However, in this quantitative model, only the expected number of fatalities is
considered with a safety perspective. It means this model and criteria are not suitable
for environmental assessment. According to the report of the SAFEDOR project
(Skjong et al., 2005), they adopt a new CAT (Cost to Avert one tonne of spilled oil)
criterion with a threshold value of $60,000 per tonne of spilled oil, which takes oil
pollution into consideration in the qualitative model. However, after that numerous
countries and organizations sent critical comments on the new CAT criterion adopted
in FSA studies submitted by SAFEDOR, and this environmental criteria has not been
widely accepted.
When it comes to the last step of FSA on recommendation for decision-making, all
other four steps need to be considered and the final recommendations shall reduce
the risk to the “desired level” as well as being cost effective. According to the FSA
Guidelines, both the individual and society types of risk for crews, passengers and
third parties shall be included in the report. In order to reduce these risks to a
“desired level”, an acceptable level of risk shall be decided and the As Low As
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle (HSE 2001) in figure 5 is often adopted
during this process.
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Figure 2: ALARP principle (page 48, MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12)
The carrot diagram in Figure 2 shows that risk falling into the ALARP region
shall be reduced until it is no longer reasonable to reduce the risk according to the
result of step 4 Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA). The proposed values for NCAF
and GCAF in Table 4 can be found in ANNEX of FSA Guidelines.

Table 4: Cost-effective Criteria (MSC 72/16)
However, the value of indices of CEA is only provided for illustrative purpose and is
not yet explicitly defined and, so far, the acceptable level of environmental risk is
still under discussion.
For the individual risk, which is person and location specific, although the risk of
death, injury and ill heath could all be affected by a ship accident, the risk of death is
usually taken to determine the maximally exposed individual risk. The F-N curve
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(Figure 3) can be adopted to express the individual risk through number of fatalities
and the cumulative frequency of year. Considering the individual risk acceptance
criteria usually adopted in the FSA study, maximum tolerable risk for crew members
is 10E-3 annual fatal risk and the negligible risk is 10E-6 annual fatal risk. However,
the individual risk for crew members and passengers may be stricter.

Figure 3: Example F-N curve (espoo report 2009)
According to the document submitted by Norway about risk acceptance criteria (see
Table 5), the criteria adopted by different industries are similar with each other and
the topic of obtaining more explicit criteria is still under discussion.
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Table 5: Individual risk criteria in use (Skjong et al. 2002)
However, the society risk is usually expressed by Potential Loss of Life (PLL) to
quantify the risk in many FSA studies. Moreover, one method combining PLL with a
multi-dimensional F-N diagram has been adopted currently (see Figure 4)
(Knontovas, 2005). Both society risk and individual risk shall be adequately
considered for a more comprehensive safety assessment according to the specific
application field.
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Figure 4: FN curve for passenger ro/ro ships (MSC 72/16)

3.4. Global trends and future development
The marine industry is both proactive and reactive regarding ship safety. However,
the rule-making process of IMO is now moving from reactive to proactive and the
formal safety assessment is still quite a useful and amateur tool for revision of
existing regulations and development of new ones.
A great number of achievements have been made and more and more FSA studies
need to be finished for the further improvement of IMO regulations. Currently, a new
amendment of FSA Guidelines with more advanced techniques has been approved
by MSC/MEPC committee. Meanwhile, the expert group of FSA is focusing on
reviewing those FSA studies submitted, using more complete procedures.
As environmental protection issues became a more and more important topic in IMO,
the corresponding group on environmental risk evaluation criteria was established in
2008 and is still working. After the submission of the FSA studies of the SAFEDOR
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project (Skjong et al., 2005), adoption of the criterion of Cost to Avert one Tonne of
Spilled Oil (CAT) was widely discussed.
The outcome of the correspondence group was added into annex 7 of the newly
revised FSA Guidelines in 2012.

The consolidated database was developed based

on IOPCF data, US data and Norwegian data and some regression formulae has been
provided for further analysis. Future Guidelines for the environmental FSA have
been recommended by the correspondence group to IMO for further discussion.
However, so far no explicit environmental risk evaluation criterion is proposed by
FSA guidelines.
Thus far FSA guidelines do not stipulate how to assess environmental risk. In the
55th session of MEPC (October 2006), however, the IMO decided to act on this
subject. A major topic in Annex 3 of document MEPC 55/18 was the definition and
analysis of risk evaluation criteria for accidental releases to the environment and
specifically for releases of oil. The discussion on the environmental criteria was also
focused on the criteria of CATS from the SAFEDOR report.
To sum up, the future work of IMO on FSA shall be the environmental related issues
as well as dealing with those limitations that affect the reliability of the FSA study.
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4. Preparatory work before the FSA for the development of a mandatory
Polar Code
4.1. Problem definition and generic model of study
As mentioned in chapter 2, vessel traffic in both polar regions is increasing rapidly
these years. Considering the vulnerable ecosystem of polar waters, stricter rules of
navigation safety and environmental protection have been regulated and discussed in
IMO. The mandatory Polar Code is definitely the most important one still under
development.
Historically, few accidents have occurred in the Polar waters, but zero accidents
today does not mean that certain accidents cannot happen. The actual risk level of
vessels navigating in polar waters has been analyzed thorough a risk model in order
to predict the future probabilities. The accident of the Explorer sinking in the
Southern Ocean and passenger vessel Clipper Adventure grounding in the Arctic
area gave us good examples, illustrating that the need for a risk model is critical. It
shows that historical accident statistics can be very deceiving especially when small
samples are recorded in the database.
Moreover, for ships navigating in polar waters, a major catastrophic accident could
not only involve large numbers of fatalities but also would cause huge irreversible
damage to the environment. Therefore, a proactive full or partial FSA study is
essential because the tolerance for accidents in polar waters is quite low.
As very broad FSA studies can be harder to manage (page 6, MSC 91/16), it is
necessary to narrow the boundary of analysis beforehand and define the problem
clearly.
The FSA studies for ships navigating in Polar waters could be divided into several
reports or parts by taking into account different relevant aspects such as ship
categories, accident categories and risks associated with consequences. The functions,
features, characteristics and attributes that are the same to all ships of the type in the
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whole FSA study will be clearly illustrated by a Generic Model. The decision on the
essential elements mentioned above heavily depends on investigation into the
historical database as well as opinions from experts, and it will be discussed in the
next chapter.

4.2. Historical data collection and analysis related to ships navigating in polar
waters
Prior to the development of the FSA studies, a number of early studies and statistics
are quite useful and shall be consulted. All the further risk assessments shall be based
on a sound knowledge of the traffic density and types as well as accident categories
as a key input.

4.2.1. Geographical boundary of polar waters
According to the current drafting of the mandatory Polar Code, the polar waters
including both Arctic and Antarctic waters are defined separately by IMO, which can
be indicated in Figure 5 and Figure 6. Actually, the definition of polar waters in the
Polar Code is the same one adopted in the Guidelines for ships navigating in the
Polar Waters.
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Figure 5: maximum extent of Arctic waters application （Guidelines for ships
navigating in polar waters, 2011）

Figure 6: Maximum extent of Antarctic Waters application （Guidelines for ships
navigating in polar waters, 2011）
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However, it could be easily found that the traffic in the Norwegian Sea, Iceland and
Faroe Islands was not included in defined Arctic water, and even some vessel
activities in US and Canadian waters are not included. When looking into the
database of vessel traffic, for example the AMSA report, samples are quite small if
vessels and accidents are selected according to the IMO definition of polar waters,
especially in Arctic waters.
A sound database with more reliable records is quite important during the
preparatory stage of FSA studies in order to decide the scope and depth of the
research. It can also help to correctly estimate the future tendency of vessel traffic
and density and maximally determine the risks and hazards.
Therefore, the geographic limitation of the FSA shall be defined according to the
IMO adopted polar waters. However, during the preparatory historical data collection
and analysis stage, the author strongly recommends that all “Circumpolar North
Region” defined by Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) report shall be
covered. The database of AMSA includes various kinds of vessels such as
icebreakers, container ships, tankers, offshore supply vessels, ferries and coast guard
ships (Brigham, 2010). This kind of database can provide a holistic approach for the
experts involved with the FSA to identify more potential risks to the arctic marine
environment as well as navigation safety.
Moreover, considering the purpose of the FSA study, the possibilities to narrow the
geographical scope into Arctic waters and Antarctic waters separately shall be
further discussed considering the significant differences between the

Arctic and

Antarctic water areas such as geographical features, types of vessel categories, as
well as sea ice, meteorological and environmental conditions.
Above all, the geographic scope of the FSA study for a mandatory polar code shall
comply with the polar waters defined in it and the historical data analysis for the
traffic and accidents could be broader and more flexible regarding the study
purposes.
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4.2.2. Analysis of traffic data in polar waters
Currently, vessel traffic data can be collected from the ArcticData portal
(www.articdata.is) of the Protection of Arctic Marine Environment Working Group
(PAME), which is one of the six arctic council working groups. A summary of the
total number of vessels per category per country in Figure 11 within the annual
report of AMSA in 2009 can be adopted as a useful resource for FSA preparatory
work. The chart below (Figure 7) shows that container ships, bulk carriers, fishing
vessels and general cargo ships are the dominant categories of ships navigating in
arctic waters.
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Figure 7. Total number of vessels for each country by vessel type

However, when taking these statistics into consideration, the data provided by the
U.S. with a large number of containers and general cargo ships includes the vessels
plying the Great Circle Routes below 60 degrees north. Therefore, according to the
AMSA report, four categories of vessel activities were highlighted for marine use:
community re-supply, bulk cargo, tourism and fishing vessel activities operations.
One thing that should be mentioned is that fishing vessels have been excluded from
the scope of ships for application according to the new draft of the mandatory Polar
Code. Leaving aside the importance of the Polar Code for fishing vessels, the
historical accidents and traffic records of fishing vessels are quite useful for the
hazard identification stage and should be carefully collected and analyzed.
The ArcticData portal can also provide data relating to marine accidents and
incidents for 2008 and 2009 with Excel form. The information includes the following
information from 1995 to 2004 for further analysis:
l

Source of Information

l

Categories of ships

l

Date and position of accident happened,

l

Related Large Marine Ecosystem (LME) and EEZ,
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l

Lives lost and total fatalities

l

Fuel spill with amount spilled

l

Total loss, actual/constructive loss and ice damage

l

Primary reason and description

According to the statistics in 2009, there were 294 accidents and incidents recorded
by different countries. Figure 11 shows the summary of statistics within the AMSA
report 2009.
Vessel Type

Number

Bulk carrier

37

Container ship

8

Fishing vessel

108

General cargo ship

72

Governmental vessels

11

Oil/Gas Service & Supply

1

Passenger ship

27

Pleasure Craft

0

Tanker ship

12

Tug/Barge

15

Unknown

2

Primary Reason

Number

Collision

22

Damage to Vessel

54

Fire/Explosion

25

Grounded

68

Machinery Damage/Failure

71

Sunk/Submerged

43

Miscellaneous

10

Table 6. Accidents and Incidents in the Arctic, 1995-2004
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A study of tiered risk assessment based on ArcticData provided by the International
Association of Antarctica Tour Operation (IAATO) was submitted to IMO in 2011.
However, the scope of the study was narrowed to focus on passenger ships
navigating in Polar waters as defined by IMO Guidelines of polar waters. Figure 12
and Figure 13 show the development of the statistics based on ArcticData by
IAATO.

Figure 8: Overview of casualty data for the Arctic – breakdown of incident/accidents
per category

48	
  

Figure 9: Overview of casualty data for the Arctic – breakdown of incidents per year
(year round operations)
The number of passenger vessels illustrated in the diagrams is quite small when

the

IMO geographical definition of arctic water is adopted. Compared to the total
number of 4,475 individual vessels including 277 passenger vessels listed in
ArcticData, the number of the sample is too small to be reliable and convincing.
Therefore, some consequences based on these statistics as well as the final
conclusion may not be directly adopted in the further assessment. As the author
mentioned in the last section, a larger navigable area with similar geographical
features could be included in the preparatory stage and hazard identification stage.

4.2.3. Limitations of utilizing historical data in preparatory work of FSA
studies
During the preparatory stage of FSA studies, regarding historical data analysis, the
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major limitations can be discussed in two aspects. One is the limitation of the
database itself, and the other one is the limitation of the future application.
The limitation of the database depends on those key elements such as database
structure, geographical scope, vessel categories and accident categories. Generally
speaking, only accidents with consequences that could be checked are recorded.
However, there could be a large amount of “near miss” accidents without any
recording. Actually, these “near miss” cases or warnings are critical to the first
hazard identification step. Therefore, the underreporting issue is always mentioned in
the limitations of FSA study. For water areas like the Arctic and Antarctic with small
vessel samples, the limitation of the database may totally change the final results of
the study. The analysis of historical data should be consulted more scientifically and
carefully.
As to the limitation of the future application, the proactive approach of FSA studies
has to be emphasized here. Studies only derived from historical data may not help to
develop proactive regulations. The brainstorming of experts during the preparatory
stage is strongly recommended in order to maximally mitigate the limitation. The
combination of historical data and expert opinion could provide a more solid
foundation for further FSA studies.
4.3. Discussion of the priority for FSA studies for ships navigating in Polar
waters
The purpose of developing a mandatory Polar Code is to provide strong safety and
environmental provisions for the shipping industry and IMO member nations, who
are interested in future polar navigation. FSA study is still the method recommended
by IMO for the rule-making process. However, a full and comprehensive FSA study
takes a comparatively longer time. Some former FSA studies took more than one
year to complete. The development of the Polar Code has taken several years and it
should be completed according to the schedule and to be implemented in those areas
as soon as possible. Therefore, the priority fields of study become quite important at
the preparatory stage. The major considerations of this will be discussed according to
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the differences between the two polar waters and between safety risk and
environmental risk.
4.3.1. Arctic waters vs. Antarctic waters
The analysis of historical traffic and accident data is aimed at developing a
comprehensive representation of current and future traffic conditions in the polar
waters. Compared to the Antarctic, vessel traffic especially cruise ships in the Arctic
waters is increasing more rapidly because of the disappearance of large amounts of
sea ice, in summer time especially. According to a 2009 AMSA report, the number
of cruise ship passengers had more than doubled. Moreover, the number of cruise
ships will continuously increase, considering the growth of the economies of the
circumpolar nations due to tourism. Besides cruise ships, more shipping lines and
cargo owners interested in transit Arctic routes are preparing to take the newly
opened shipping lane in Arctic waters. As a result, more ship accidents and incidents
will happen in Arctic water in the forthcoming years.
Regarding the environmental protection aspect, although both Arctic and Antarctic
waters have the same ecological features and vulnerabilities, the condition of
Antarctic waters is much better than Arctic waters. As mentioned before, the waters
south of 60 degrees south latitude have been designated as Antarctic special Area
under MARPOL 73/78 Annex I, Annex II and Annex V with stricter requirements
and also the use and carriage of heavy fuel oils is prohibited in Antarctic waters
according to a new amendment to Annex I of MARPOL. However, the Arctic waters
have not been included in the list of special areas.
Furthermore, the Antarctic governance is a good example of regional cooperation
based on the Antarctic treaty with several agreements. The Protocol on
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty is a powerful tool for protection of
the Antarctic waters. As to the Arctic waters, for the time being, there is still no
equivalent powerful legal regime to govern this area.
Therefore, the mandatory Polar Code, once enforced, will become the most
important rule for polar navigation, especially for Arctic water. The provisions for
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environmental protection will, to some extent, fill the gap of sustainable
development between the two polar waters.

4.3.2. The navigation safety risk vs. environmental risk
As a full FSA study, both navigation safety issues and environmental protection
issues shall be considered in every step of FSA. However, the scope of most of the
FSA studies until now has been narrowed to navigation safety of ship and personnel
in order to facilitate the approach to the assessment.
Moreover, the environmental issues are usually not included in the study because
some kinds of ships do not present extraordinary hazards to the environment through
the investigation of historical data. However, considering the environmental
vulnerability of both polar waters, the risk of ship-borne oil spill could be quite
significant and irreversible.
Moreover, IMO is still constantly working with member states and other
organizations to protect the marine environment from damage caused by ships,
especially oil spills by ships. A cost-benefit assessment (CBA) based on
environmental risk assessment has been carried out in the FSA FOR Crude oil tanker
SAFEDOR project. The recommendation relating to CBA aroused a lot of discussion
between countries and organizations, especially for the newly adopted CAT model
and related environmental risk evaluation criteria (EREC). As a result, a
correspondence group was established to develop an EREC and review of the
environmental part of this FSA. Moreover, as mentioned before, the correspondence
group even recommended developing IMO Guidelines for the environmental FSA. It
shows that the environmental risk assessment is now a greater concerned to the
international community and the gap between navigation safety and environmental
safety is going to be filled owing to technological improvements and broader
international discussion and cooperation.
Referring to the historical data provided in Table 6 from AMSA 2009, it can be seen
that grounding is one of the most common accidents in Polar waters and one of the
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major contributors to oil spills. The environmental risk of grounding has to be
assessed in order to make appropriate provisions accordingly.
Therefore, the author recommends, during the preparatory stage of FSA for the
mandatory Polar Code, the environmental FSA shall be considered as important as
the safety FSA. Regarding the progress of development of the Code, an
environmental FSA for the working group of IMO could be more urgent and useful
to the working group of IMO. The comments and discussion aroused by
environmental FSA could also provide important sources for future amendments to
the Code.

4.4. Summary
The preparatory step of the FSA is quite important and linkage between the
preparatory step to other following steps is also strong, especially the hazard
identification step. The FSA studies of the mandatory Polar Code should be carried
out for the rule-making process (if time is sufficient) or as soon as possible after the
adoption of the Code for further amendment. A full FSA study considering both
safety and environmental protection for the whole polar waters is definitely helpful;
however it is also more complicated and time-consuming.
Therefore, the author suggests that the scope of study shall be narrowed to focus on
more urgent requirements from the international community and other areas of
concern could be completed based on this study.
Considering all related matters mentioned in this Chapter, the author thinks the most
important FSA study for the Code should be the environmental FSA for the Arctic
waters. Cruise ships or bulk carriers can be the categories of ships involved at the
first stage and the main accident category shall be focused on the grounding of
vessels.
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5. Challenges of the Application of FSA for the mandatory polar code
5.1. Potential hazard identification and analysis
5.1.1. IMO HAZID workshops for Polar Code
As a risk-based Polar Code, the structure and outcome of the Code have to be
consistent with a risk assessment. It is necessary to gather all stakeholders of the
Code to discuss all the possible risks for the early adoption of the Code.
According to the report of the HAZID workshop (DE 53/18/5, 2009) submitted by
Denmark concerning human life of Arctic waters, a risk matrix (Figure 10) was
developed during the meeting in accordance with the Guidelines of FSA. The high,
medium and low risk of navigation in arctic waters was ranked through the
discussion during the meeting, which recommended being a basis for the further
development of the Polar Code.
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Figure 10: Risk Matrix for ships operating in Arctic waters (source DE 53/18/5)
Therefore, in order to encourage the development of environment aspects of the
Polar Code, the work of the Polar Code Hazard Identification workshop has already
been carried out coordinated by NDV in 2011. Comparing with the HAZID of
human life, the difficulties of environmental HAZID are the lack of data and
information on the impact of environmental hazards as there is relatively lower
vessel traffic density than any other sea area. Therefore, the analysis of the historical
accident data can provide limited contributions for the HAZID process. The integrity
of the potential hazard list as well as the further risk matrix with ranking of hazards
mostly depends on discussion and brainstorming between experts.
According to the report of HAZID workshop 2011, a draft hazard matrix (see Annex
I) has already been developed, which can be quite useful for further discussion.
However, the outcome of the workshop is not quite satisfactory because of the
limited time of discussion. The full hazard list relating to the impacts of the
environment as well as the corresponding control options was not completed by
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experts. Moreover, the work of ranking listed hazards was not covered in this
workshop. Therefore, a lot of work still needs to be done for hazard identification,
especially the determination of the priority of risks.

5.1.2. Ranking of risk scenarios
Although the workshop on the Polar Code in 2011 did not provide a complete
HAZID for further environmental FSA studies, this workshop has already provided a
good direction for the future HAZID work. According to the report, the release
assessment has been considered as an important step of HAZID. The environmental
impacts of ships’ activities are divided into possible routine releases into the
environment and possible accidental releases into the environment with a detail
description list (see Annex II) of release categories. Moreover, the contributing
factors and some related risk control measures are also listed in the report. Taking
these factors into consideration, a more useful qualitative or quantitative risk analysis
could be constructed accordingly.
A qualitative assessment can be adopted according to the release scenario. A group
of experts could be organized regarding the assessment requirements and work
together on the ranking process. The probability of routine release and accidental
release as well as the severity of consequences can be discussed and completed
during the meeting of experts. Meanwhile, the related control options could be listed
for step 3 risk control options.

5.1.3. Challenges of HAZID for Polar Code
As mentioned above, the first challenges of HAZID for the Polar Code is the
completeness of the hazard list. As a basis of all further assessments, all potential
risks should be identified in this stage. Considering the drafting hazard list provided
by IMO, some important potential hazards such as introduction of alien species and
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underwater noises (DE 56/INF 3) have still not been included or discussed. More
systematic analysis should be carried out by work groups by adopting the methods
recommended in FSA Guidelines such as HAZOP and FMEA in order to identify all
environmental hazards as well as initial events.
Another big challenge for the HAZID process is the ranking of risks as there is no
specific risk matrix recommended by IMO for the environmental FSA study. Until
now, the discussion within the IMO has only covered oil spills as a consequence of
accidents. However, the discussion of the oil spill could be a preparatory work for
further improvement of the generic environmental risk assessment.
Regarding the report of the correspondence group for environmental risk evaluation
criteria, the frequency index (FI) has been proposed by the working group for use in
the safety FSA methodology (MEPC 60/22). However, the severity index (SI) is still
under discussion as related environmental risk evaluation criteria for the quantitative
assessment has not been agreed upon.
However, concerning the ranking of hazards for the development of the Polar Code,
there may not be enough time to wait for the organization to provided generic
reference criteria. The better way to carry out the job within a limited time might be
to accept the SI decided by the experts based on the IMO SI table. The types,
amounts and timings of the release of hazards (Fairman, 1999) could also be
considered in order to make the SI more appropriate for the environmental
assessment. Once the related criteria are approved by IMO, it could be adopted in the
future amendment process for the Polar Code.

5.2. Measures for Risk assessment
The second step of FSA is the detailed assessments of the causes and initial events
and consequences of those release scenarios identified in step one (MSC 91/16).
Compared to qualitative assessment by experts, a quantitative method is much more
complicated and takes more time to finish. However, it is a more systematic way to
identify and rank the hazards compared to the limited knowledge of experts. The
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quantitative method to estimate the probability of all potential data can be carried out
through different ways. For example, the historical data could be used for
investigation. As the database for Polar waters is comparatively small, the outcome
of the assessment could be not reliable. Moreover, the quantitative method could
only be carried out according to the implicit environmental risk evaluation criteria
approved by IMO. As mentioned before, these generic criteria have not been
discussed while the specific criteria for oil spills are under development.
Another method that could be adopted here is the simulation of scenarios. After
listing the contributory factors and causes of routine and accidental scenarios, the
probability of release could be concluded on the basis of the statistics collected
during and after the simulation process. Those historical data in polar waters as well
as in other sea areas could be used to verify the results. As to the quantitative method
of determining the severity of the consequences of the risk scenarios, various
methods of ecological impact assessment could be adopted and the related
consequences of risk scenarios can be estimated by those methods such as Predicted
No Effect Concentration (PNEC) and fuzzy logic. However, the accuracy of the
consequences assessment of a ship’s release based on an ecological impact
assessment with related assessment criteria has to be further considered by the
experts.
Compared to the quantitative method, qualitative assessment is easier and timesaving.
According to FSA Guidelines, the use of techniques like Dalphi for expert judgment
could be used, where data is unavailable (page 11, MSC 91/16).

5.3. Risk Control Options
The step of risk control options aims at identifying all the risk control measures
(RCM) for the identified risks with new methods of operation or management and
providing a combination of RCM for further cost benefit assessment. According to
the report of a work shop in 2011, the following RCO has been listed:
•

Ice strengthening for ships.
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Ice forecasts.
Availability of ice breakers.
Navigation aids that fully function in polar waters.
Equipment and systems that function correctly, and on demand, in extreme
cold.
Additives for fuel to prevent waxing (prevent failure or failure on demand).
Restricted bunker fuel oil type(s).
Stricter routine discharge limits compared to IMO baseline (MARPOL).
Enforcement of discharge limits.

The RCO is based on the risk levels of hazards provided by the first step. The
limitations of step one will strongly affect the result of the RCO. One of the
limitations of step one that has to be mentioned is the conclusion based on expert
opinion.

According to the discussion in the last two sections, the better way or

more timesaving way to carry out the HAZID and risk assessment strongly relies on
the decisions made by experts. What’s more, the RCO step also relies on expert
opinion (Knotavas, 2009). Compared with finding RCO from historical data, the
reasonable estimation of risk reduction could be more proactive and helpful to find
new operation and management measures. Therefore, these two important steps,
even step two for re-evaluation, are all decided by experts. The experts become quite
a vulnerable chain of the assessment.
Taking advantage of reliable techniques for experts as mentioned could be an option
to solve the problem. However, the calculation of concordance coefficient, as
proposed by FSA Guidelines, provides a technical way to judge the degree of
agreement between experts. After calculation of concordance coefficient by formula,
the level of agreement will be described as:
W

> 0.7

Good agreement

W

0.5 – 0.7

Medium agreement

W

< 0.5

Poor agreement

Table 7: Concordance coefficient (MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12)
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The decision made by experts with a concordance coefficient could be adopted and
the result could be regarded as a reference for the next linking steps as well the final
decision-making step.

5.4. Cost benefit assessments
The cost-benefit assessment is an important step and it has been completed with
quantitative methods. The cost and benefit of the RCOs obtained from step 3 shall be
carefully calculated by proper methods and techniques. The biggest challenges of
this step must be the calculation of indices for the cost-effectiveness as the
environmental risk evaluation criteria has not yet been decided.
However, the risk evaluation criteria of oil release have been discussed within IMO
after the adoption of the criterion of CATS within the SAFEDOR report. In this repot,
the threshold value of $60,000/tonne aroused debate at IMO, as it is a critical issue
for the future decision-making process. As a result, a decision was made by MEPC
62 to establish a working group on environmental risk evaluation criteria to finalize
step 4 based on the CATS model (MEPC 62/24). This means there will be a criteria
proposed by IMO soon.
Compared with the complexity of the cost benefit assessment of oil spills, the
comprehensive assessment involved in environmental FSA for the Polar Code will
be more complicated. The discussion of generic environmental criteria has not been
put on the table yet. However, the specific model could be adopted if the scope of
study was narrowed into specific accident categories, for example the accidents of
grounding. As one of the primary causes of accidents in polar waters as well as one
of the major contributors to oil spills, the CATS model could be adopted for the
cost-benefit assessment and related criteria recommended could also be used for the
determination of SI of the HAZID period and the decision making period. The full
environmental FSA could be carried out after adoption of the generic criteria for
amendments of the related regulations in the future.
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5.5. Recommendations for decision making
According to the flow chart of FSA methodology (Figure 11), the final step of
recommendations for decision-making is directly and indirectly based on all other
previous steps.

Figure 11: Flow chart of FSA methodology (MSC 91/16)
The RCOs recommended by step 4 shall reduce the risks to a level “as low as
reasonably practical” and to be “cost effective”. Subsequently, the suggestion for
rule improvement or amendment shall be carried out accordingly. Moreover, the list
of recommended RCOs with the application of RCOs shall be listed.
For environmental FSA, the difficult part of this step is how to find an ALARP
region with appropriate risk acceptance criteria. However, both individual and
societal risks adopted in former FSA studies are based on crew fatalities or passenger
fatalities, which is not the major concern of environmental protection. The
acceptance criteria for assessing damage to the environment could be established by
adopting the extent of environmental damage to replace the extent of personal injury.
Both quantitative method and qualitative method can be used to establish the
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environmental criteria. Compared to quantitative risk acceptance criteria with
explicit numbers, the qualitative criteria including environmental damage in defined
by seriousness classes (Nijs, 2009) could be simpler and more appropriate. The risk
acceptance matrix for society risks established in France (see Figure 12) is an
example of this.

Figure 12: (Nijs, 2009) Risk Acceptance Matrix for Society Risks
The red fields represent an unacceptable risk and the yellow fields show where the
new plant can be approved, on condition that all ALARA safety measures are
implemented. The seriousness of the hazard and the frequency could be decided by
the expert group. Considering the specific nature of polar waters, the seriousness
degree of environmental damage will be comparatively higher than other sea areas.
The environmental acceptance criteria, which have been established by other
countries regarding local waters or rivers, can also be used to verify the final results.

5.6. Summary
The major challenges of the environmental FSA for the polar code are the lack of
generic environmental risk evaluation criteria, which makes the qualitative method a
better choice for early stages of study. However, the progress of the working group
involving the environmental risk evaluation criteria for oil spills is satisfactory owing
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to the support from member states and related organizations. After appropriate
definition of the scope of study, the environmental FSA with qualitative assessments
could be carried out based on the current available criteria and the future generic
criteria could be adopted for a full and more comprehensive FSA for further
amendments.
As to the experts, the decision relying on judgment of experts cannot be avoided in
every step of FSA. A more technical method such as Delphi as well as the
calculation of concordance coefficient can be adopted to improve and check the
results of experts. Moreover, the qualification of the experts with requirements has
been regulated in the FSA Guidelines (page 70, MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12) in order to
ensure the reliability of the expert decision.
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6. Conclusion and recommendations for the future works
6.1. Conclusion
With climate change and other activities of human beings already placing pressure
on the polar region, additional marine activities are inevitably increasing the burden
of the vulnerable ecosystems of Polar Regions. However, the increase in areas
without ice-coverage in Arctic waters has aroused more interest from the maritime
industry to open new shipping routes. The number of vessels taking advantage of the
trans-Arctic routes almost doubled this year, which shows the growth tendency of
future vessel traffic. As a result, risks such as oil spill, illegal release and
introduction of invasive species are increasing rapidly. Therefore, the development
of a mandatory Polar Code is quite important in order to protect the last pristine land
for human beings.
Considering the development of the Polar Code in IMO, from the proposal for
guidelines first submitted in 1996 to the recommendatory guidelines for Arctic
ice-covered areas approved by IMO in 2002, it has taken almost seven years to finish
the job. It has taken another seven years for the organization to develop guidelines
for ships operating in the polar waters, from 2002 to 2009. During this period, more
accidents happened in these areas, arousing the concerns of countries and
organization

to

provide

more

specific

regulations

both

mandatory

and

recommendatory for the polar waters. Therefore, the mandatory Polar Code has
become one of the most important tasks of the DE sub-committee.
However, compared to the recommendatory guidelines, the development of a
mandatory Polar Code is more complicated and time-consuming. At the early stage,
the member groups have approved the major structure of the Code, which provides
functional requirements supported by prescriptive provisions with both mandatory
and recommendatory parts by risk based approach. Nowadays, the discussion of the
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mandatory Polar Code in IMO is now moving from some basic principles such as
main structure, scope of ship categories and definition of geographic coverage to
more detailed functional requirements and regulations. Recently, proposals for a
specific environmental protection chapter have been approved and listed as chapter
15 in the draft for further discussion. Therefore, how to make appropriate regulations
to reduce environmental damage in polar waters is widely discussed among member
states and organizations. All kinds of suggestion and recommendations from
different stakeholders submitted to IMO makes the decision-making process more
and more complicated and difficult. The formal safety assessment, as a risk-based
tool recommended by IMO, can proactively provide useful and practical suggestions
for the final decision-making process and speed-up the progress of approval and
implementation of the Code.
Considering the development of FSA, a lot of studies and achievements before2006
were focused on safety issues. During that time, the first official version of FSA
guidelines was approved in 2002 and the amendments for FSA guidelines were
adopted in 2006. The benchmark for environment issues shall be the submission of a
series of FSA studies included in the EU SAFEDOR project. The special
environmental concerns about oil spills from reports of crude oil tankers aroused
wide debates and discussions in IMO. A significant breakthrough on the study of
environmental risk evaluation assessment has been achieved by the designated
correspondence group. Therefore, the author thinks the environmental FSA with
appropriate criteria could be quite useful for the development of an environmental
protection chapter of the mandatory Polar Code.
In order to facilitate the progress of the FSA, the scope of area concerned has to be
narrowed and carefully defined beforehand. The historical data was analyzed by the
author in order to decide the priority area to be considered. Moreover, the further
investigation into differences between the two polar waters and the essentialities
between environmental issues and safety issues for the current drafting stage of the
Code provides more useful information for the preparatory work. According to the
outcome of these analyses, the author recommends carrying out an environmental
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FSA for Arctic waters for bulk carriers or passenger ships concerning specific
accident categories like grounding or collision.
After investigation into of each step of environmental FSA, the challenges of each
step were analyzed and discussed and possible methods to solve the problems were
also provided by the author. The lack of generic environmental risk evaluation
criteria is a key contributor to the failure of adopting a quantitative method.
Therefore, the qualitative method is a better choice at early stages of study. What’s
more, special attention should be paid to the qualification of experts, as it is a critical
factor for the whole process.

Furthermore, another option was provided by the

author considering the current specific criteria for oil spills provided by the working
group. The quantitative method can be achieved by narrowing the scope of ship
release to oil spills only. This might be a more systematic and comprehensive
method that can verify the results obtained by a qualitative approach.

6.2. Recommendations for future studies
As far as the challenges and possible solutions are concluded, the author would like
to make the following recommendations for future works to IMO, interested
international organizations and states:
l

A correspondence group for environmental FSA should be established to
improve future studies. The improvement of mandatory Polar Code is one of the
major tasks need to be accomplished currently.

l

IMO should encourage the DE sub-Committee to further investigate the
environmental protection part of the Code in order to identify those factors of
inappropriate and out of concern in order to support the environmental FSA
study.

l

Classification societies such as DNV and GL should continue to work on the
environmental FSA study for improving the future ship design standard of
environmental protection for those ships operating in polar waters.

l

A workshop for polar code HAZID should be held again to complete the list of
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potential hazards and risk matrix for risk assessment.
l

Member states, especially circum-arctic countries and member states of the
Antarctic treaty should further improve vessel traffic monitoring and accidents
database for polar waters in order to provide more reliable statistics for further
investigation.

l

Those member states, especially circum-arctic countries should also organize the
environmental FSA studies in order to improve the local environmental
regulations relating to polar waters.

l

Those related international organizations such as IAATO and Clean shipping
Coalition (CSC), which have experts in different areas such as ecology, biology
and ship design, should continue to work together with IMO to improve the
environmental protection part of the Code. Those experts should also be
encouraged to be involved in all stages of the environmental FSA in the future.
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APPENDIX A
Polar Code – Hazards Matrix previously prepared by IMO Work Group
(sources: Polar Code HARZID Workshop Report , 2011)
Conditions/Areas	
  of	
  concern	
   	
   Table	
  1	
  of	
  4	
  Environmental	
   	
   Conditions	
  
	
  
Potential	
  
Hazards	
  

1.1	
   Low	
  
temp	
  
	
  
	
  

air	
  

Possible	
  consequences	
  

Intermediate	
  Result	
  

Potential	
  Result	
  

1.1.1	
   Loss	
  
performance	
  
	
  

1.1.1.1Side	
  shell	
  rupture	
  

Water	
   ingress	
   –	
   capsize	
   –	
  
sinking	
  –	
  pollution	
  
Flooding	
  
–	
  
machinery	
  
damage	
  –	
  capsize	
  
Pollution	
  
System	
  failure	
  e.g.	
  fire	
  main	
  
1.1.2.1.1.	
  
Grounding,	
  
stranding,	
  trapped	
  in	
  ice	
  
Evacuation	
  problems	
  

of	
  

material	
  

1.1.1.2	
  Side	
  shell	
  fitting	
  failure	
  

	
  
	
  
1.1.2	
   Machinery	
   [equipment]	
  
malfunction	
  
	
   	
   1.1.2.a	
   Battery	
   fails	
   to	
   start	
  
unit	
  
	
   	
   1.1.2.b	
   Electric	
   contacts	
  
malfunction	
  
	
   	
   1.1.2.c	
   Loss	
   of	
   working	
  
clearance	
  -‐	
  seizure	
  
	
   	
   1.1.2.d	
   Loss	
   of	
   lubricant	
  
performance	
  (high	
  viscosity)	
  

1.1.1.3	
  Rupture	
  of	
  deck	
  piping	
  
	
  
1.1.2.1	
  Reduced	
  maneuverability	
   	
  
	
  
Emergency	
  equip	
  non-‐start	
  

	
   	
   1.1.2.e	
   Moisture	
   freezes	
   –	
  
mechanical	
  seizure	
  

Fire	
   flap	
   won’t	
   close;	
   cargo	
   vents	
  
freeze;	
  winch	
  brakes	
  fail	
  

1.1.3	
  Freezing	
  of	
  fluid/cargo	
  
	
  

1.1.1.1	
  Side	
  shell	
  rupture	
  
1.1.3.1	
  Cargo	
  damage	
  
1.1.3.2	
  Can’t	
  discharge	
  cargo	
  
1.1.3.3	
   Cargo	
   expands/contracts	
   –	
  
structural	
  damage	
  
1.1.4.1	
  Fuel	
  pumping	
  difficulties	
  

1.1.4	
   .1	
   Increased	
   fluid	
  
viscosity	
   –	
   machinery	
   –	
  
diesel	
  engine	
  
1.1.4.2	
  
Increased	
  
fluid	
  
viscosity	
   –	
   machinery	
   -‐	
  
hydraulic	
  
1.1.4.3	
  
Increased	
  
fluid	
  
viscosity	
  -‐	
  cargo	
  
1.1.5	
   	
   Effect	
  of	
  cold	
  cargo	
  on	
  
hull	
  materials	
  
1.1.6	
   	
   Loss	
   of	
   functionality	
  
of	
   operating	
   and	
   emergency	
  
equipment	
  
	
  
1.1.7	
   Loss	
   of	
   functionality	
   of	
  
doors	
  and	
  closing	
  appliances	
   	
  
	
  
1.1.8	
   Reduced	
   survival	
   time	
  
/hypothermia	
  
1.1.9	
  
Reduced	
  
human	
  
performance,	
   physical	
   and	
  

Remote	
   control	
   failure,	
   false	
  
alarms	
  
Fire	
   flaps	
   won’t	
   close;	
   cargo	
   vents	
  
freeze	
  
Rotating	
   equipment	
   starting	
  
problems	
  

1.1.4.2	
   Hydraulic	
   deck	
   equipment	
  
performance	
  

Various	
  
Fire	
   uncontrollable;	
   cargo	
  
over-‐pressure	
  
Emergency	
   fire	
   pump	
   won’t	
  
start	
  
Emergency	
   Generator	
   won’t	
  
start	
  
Fire	
   uncontrollable;	
   cargo	
  
over-‐pressure;	
  can’t	
  let	
  go	
  or	
  
retrieve	
   anchor;	
   mooring	
  
difficulties;	
  
assistance	
  
difficulties	
  
Water	
   ingress	
   –	
   capsize	
   -‐	
  
sinking	
  
	
  
	
  
1.1.3.3	
  Pollution	
  
1.1.4.1.1	
   Loss	
   of	
   electrical	
  
and/or	
  propulsive	
  power	
  

1.1.1.1.1;	
  1.1.1.2	
  

1.1.4.2.1	
  
Anchor	
  
and	
  
mooring	
   line	
   handling	
  
problems	
  
1.1.4.3.1Can’t	
  lighten	
  ship	
  in	
  
emergency	
  
Pollution	
  

	
  

	
  

Can’t	
   access	
   spaces;	
   can’t	
   close	
  
down	
   spaces	
   to	
   prevent	
   water	
  
ingress	
  or	
  to	
  fight	
  fire	
  
	
  

	
  

Various	
  

	
  

1.1.4.2	
  Cargo	
  pumping	
  difficulties	
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Conditions/Areas	
  of	
  concern	
   	
   Table	
  1	
  of	
  4	
  Environmental	
   	
   Conditions	
  
	
  

	
  

1.2	
   Low	
   water	
  
temp	
  
	
  

1.3	
   Extreme	
   &	
  
rapidly	
  
changing	
  
weather	
   	
  

cognitive	
  functions	
   	
  
	
  
1.1.10	
   Ice	
   on	
   deck	
   and	
  
superstructure	
   	
   	
  
	
  
	
  
1.1.12	
   	
   Limitation	
   of	
   SAR	
  
capabilities	
  
1.1.13	
  Increased	
  hotel	
  load??	
  
1.2.1	
  Reduced	
  survival	
  time	
  
	
  
1.2.2	
   Malfunction	
   of	
   fluid	
  
systems	
  
	
  
1.2.3	
   Clogging	
   of	
   inlets	
   &	
  
outlets	
  
1.3.1	
   Difficult	
   to	
   prepare	
   for	
  
or	
   avoid	
   dangerous	
   weather	
  
conditions	
  
1.3.2	
   Propulsion	
   and/or	
  
manoeuvring	
  
Difficulties	
  

Loss	
  of	
  stability	
  
Loss	
  of	
  footing	
  

List/capsize	
  
Personal	
  accident,	
  death	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  

Electric	
  power	
  shortage	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

Machinery	
  malfunction	
  

1.1.3.1.1	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

Conditions/Areas	
  of	
  concern	
   	
   Table	
  2	
  of	
  4	
  High	
  Latitude	
  
	
  
Potential	
  
Hazards	
  

2.1 Reduc
ed	
  
navig
ationa
l	
  aids	
  
	
  

2.2	
  
Varying	
  
availability	
  
of	
  
charts/hydrogra
phical	
  
information	
  

2.3	
  
Varying	
  
availability	
  
of	
  
charts/hydrogra
phical	
  
information	
  

Possible	
  consequences	
  
2.1.1	
   Grounding,	
   standing,	
  
trapped	
  in	
  ice	
  
2.1.2	
   Impact	
   with	
   ice	
   or	
  
other	
  structures	
  
2.1.3	
  
Lack	
  
of	
  
signals/disturbance	
  DGPS	
  
2.1.4	
  Unstable	
  gyro	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
2.2.1	
  Grounding,	
  stranding	
  
	
  
2.2.2	
  Voyage	
  planning	
  
	
  
2.3.3	
   	
   Anchoring	
  
	
  
2.3.1	
   	
   Voyage	
  planning	
  
	
  
2.3.2	
   	
   Difficult	
  to	
  prepare	
  for	
   	
  
or	
   avoid	
   dangerous	
   weather	
  
conditions/	
  situations	
  
	
  
2.3.3	
   	
   Insufficient	
   clothing	
  
and	
   supplies	
   (optimistic	
  
planning)	
  
	
  

Intermediate	
  Result	
  

Potential	
  Result	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  
	
  

2.1.2.1	
   Injuries	
   or	
  
fatalities	
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2.4	
  
Variable	
  
infrastructure	
  

2.5	
   Interference	
  
with	
   long	
   range	
  
electronic	
  
communications	
  

2.6	
  
Variable	
  
[local]	
  
communication	
  
capabilities	
  

2.7	
  
Limited	
  
search	
  
and	
  
rescue	
  
capabilities	
  

2.8	
  
Limited	
  
availability	
   of	
   oil	
  
spill	
  
preparedness	
  

2.4.1	
   	
   	
   Insufficient	
  actions	
  to	
  
incidents	
  and	
  accident	
  

	
  

2.4.1.1.	
   Potential	
   for	
  
incidences	
  
to	
  
escalate	
  
	
  

2.4.2	
   	
   	
   Insufficient	
   spill	
  
preparedness	
   	
  
2.4.3	
   	
   	
   Limited	
   compliance	
  
and	
   enforcement	
   (local	
   	
  
infrastructure,	
  
	
  
waste	
  
reception	
  facilitations)	
  
	
  
	
  
2.5.1	
   	
   	
   loss	
   of	
   possibility	
   to	
  
send	
  
distress	
  
messages/contact	
  SAR	
   	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  

2.5.2	
   	
   	
   	
   No	
   weather/ice	
  
forecast	
   	
  
2.5.3	
   	
   	
   	
   Loss	
   of	
  
communication	
  possibilities	
   	
   	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
2.6.1	
  
	
  
Communication	
  
difficulties	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

2.7.1	
   	
   	
   Insufficient	
   response	
  
to	
  incidents	
  and	
  accidents	
  
2.7.2	
   	
   	
   Lack	
   of	
   medical	
  
support	
  
2.7.3	
  Capability	
  of	
  emergency	
  
source	
  of	
  electrical	
  power.	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  

2.8.1	
   Insufficient	
   response	
   to	
  
spills	
  
	
  
2.8.2	
   	
   Damage	
   to	
   ecological	
  
systems	
  
2.8.3	
   	
   Damage	
   to	
   flora	
   and	
  
fauna	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  

2.8.1.1	
   Potential	
   for	
  
incidences	
  
to	
  
escalate	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

Conditions/Areas	
  of	
  concern	
   	
   Table	
  3	
  of	
  4	
   	
   Environmental	
  Sensitivity	
  
	
  
Potential	
  
Possible	
  consequences	
  
Intermediate	
  Result	
  
Hazards	
  
3.1.1	
   	
   Damage	
  on	
  ice	
  caused	
  by	
  soot	
   	
  
	
  
3.1.2	
  Environmental	
  damage	
  from	
  grey	
  water	
  
	
  
3.1	
   Discharges	
  
	
  
	
  
from	
  
normal	
  
	
  
	
  
operation	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
3.2	
   Oil	
   and	
   3.2.1.	
   	
   Inability	
   to	
   operate	
   pollution	
   response	
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Potential	
  Result	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

Conditions/Areas	
  of	
  concern	
   	
   Table	
  3	
  of	
  4	
   	
   Environmental	
  Sensitivity	
  
	
  
chemical	
  spill	
  
systems	
  due	
  to	
  surrounding	
  ice	
  
Note	
  3.2.1	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  consequence	
  -‐	
  it’s	
  a	
  hazard???	
   	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
3.3	
  Air	
  Pollution	
   	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Conditions/Areas	
  of	
  concern	
   	
   Table	
  4	
  of	
  4	
   	
   Human	
  Element	
  
	
  
Potential	
  
Possible	
  consequences	
  
Intermediate	
  Result	
  
Hazards	
  
4.1.1	
  Frostbite	
  
	
  
4.1	
   Lack	
   of	
   4.1.2	
  Hypothermia	
  
	
  
knowledge	
  
of	
  
	
  
	
  
personal	
  
	
  
	
  
protection	
   	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
4.2	
  Unfamiliarity	
   	
  
of	
  
polar	
   	
  
	
  
environment	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
4.3	
  
Working	
   	
  
environment	
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Potential	
  Result	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

APPENDIX B
Checklist for HAZID provided by IMO working group
(sources: Polar Code HARZID Workshop Report , 2011)
Possible Routine Releases into the Environment
• Combustion gases from main power plant (e.g. oxides of nitrogen, oxides of
sulphur, oxides of carbon, unburnt and partially burnt hydrocarbons, soot, ash,
etc.).
• Combustion gases from ancillary plant, such as incinerators (dioxins, poly
chlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)), inert gas generators, etc..
• Fugitive Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) from cargo and fuel tanks.
• Liquid waste from accommodation blocks (dirty water, sewage, etc.).
• Food waste and other solid waste from accommodation blocks.
• Liquid waste from bilge.
• Ballast water exchange.
• Greases or lubricants, for example from main propulsion or steering systems.
• Anti-fouling paints from ship hulls.
Possible Accidental Releases into the Environment
• Cargo from damaged cargo tanks or compartments.
• Cargo containers that have fallen overboard.
• Bunker fuel oil from fuel oil tanks.
Contributing Factors
• Ice bergs as collision hazard.
• Ice bergs as ship crush hazard (structural failure).
• Ice on ship superstructure (loss of stability, foundering).
• Extreme cold leading to brittleness of metal (structural failure).
• Extreme cold or icing leading to technical failure of equipment, including
emergency or backup equipment that might fail on demand due to extreme
cold or icing.
• Poor communications.
• Long response times and limited response capability.
• Weak or non-existent conventional navigational aids (lights, distinguishable
features for bearings, etc.)?
• Poor charts?
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Other issues to be considered?
• High latitude effects on navigation systems (lack of GPS, cosmic radiation
effects)?
• Variations of magnetic north/ south?
• Long days or long nights resulting in interrupted sleep patterns, loss of
alertness, poor decision making?
• Weak primary radar returns from icy shorelines?
• Difficulty of distinguishing sea ice from wave clutter with primary radar?
• Effect of cold water on spilled materials?
• Extremely low visibility or low visibility for long periods of time?
• Extreme sea state (wave height)?
• Extreme wind speed?
• Extreme brightness due to low sun, 24 hours per day?
• Seismic (volcano, earthquake) effects?
Risk Control Measures and Risk Control Options
• Ice strengthening for ships.
• Ice forecasts.
• Availability of ice breakers.
• Navigation aids that fully function in polar waters.
• Equipment and systems that function correctly, and on demand, in extreme
cold.
• Additives for fuel to prevent waxing (prevent failure or failure on demand).
• Restricted bunker fuel oil type(s).
• Stricter routine discharge limits compared to IMO baseline (MARPOL).
• Enforcement of discharge limits.
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